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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the financial impact of Social Security byage
cohort under alternative assumptions concerning future financing of Social
Security. It examines the Social Security Administration's intermediate
tIE and various combinations of optimistic and pessimistic assumptions
concerning fertility, mortality, and wage growth. Importantly, it examines
the implications of alternative potential resolutions of the long-term
financing deficit and scenarios concerning the planned systematic deviation
from pay-as-you-go finance in the retirement and disability funds.
The results suggest that the Social Security retirement program offers
vastly different returns to households in different circumstances, and
especially to different cohorts. Most important, if Social Security does
not maintain the large retirement trust fund surplus currently projected
for the next 30 years, alternative scenarios for return topay-as-you-go
finance differ dramatically in the taxes, benefits, transfers, and real
rates of return that can be offered to different birth cohorts. The
implications of cutting taxes, raising benefits or diverting the surplus to
other purposes have dramatic impact on the overall financial status of the
system, the time pattern of taxes, benefits and surpluses or deficits, and
therefore, the treatment of different age cohorts.
Under the intermediate assumptions, the OASDI surplus is projected to
grow almost as large as a fraction of CNP as the current ratio of privately
held national debt to GNP. For example, if the OASDI surplus is used to
raise benefits, and they remained at higher levels thereafter during the
height of the baby-boom generation's retirement, the long-run actuarial
deficit will zoom from $500 billion to over $3 trillion. Correspondingly,
if benefits increase, financed by the OASDI surplus over the next 30years,
the expected rate of return on lifetime contributions increases for those
currently about 40 years old from 1.9% to 2.7%, about a 40% increase.
Correspondingly, if the surplus is dissipated and the subsequent long-run
deficit is made up with a tax increase on a pay-as-you-go basis at the time
of the projected deficit, the rate of return relative to the intermediate
assumptions for those persons now being born will fall by about 15%, and in
this case, the overall system finances would move from a long-run actuarial
deficit of slightly under one-half percent of taxable payroll to actuarial
balance -
Thus,as Social Security is projected to deviate systematically from
pay-as-you-go finance, the potential alternative scenarios with respect to
accruing the surplus and/or dissipating it in various ways have potentially
large intergenerational redistribution effects.
Michael J. Boskin Douglas J. Puffert
NBER NBER
204 Junipero Serra Boulevard 204 Junipero Serra Boulevard
Stanford, CA 94305 Stanford, CA 943051. Introduction
For most Americans, anticipated Social Security retirement benefits
have a value larger than the total value of their other financial
assets)- Likewise,more than half of the workers in the United
States pay more in Old Age, Survivors, Disability, and Hospital
Insurance (OASDHI) "contributions" than theypay in personal income
taxes. Because the program looms so large in the financial picture of
so many, it is reasonable to assume that there is a significant demand
for an investment evaluation of the "deal" it offers citizens.However,
the program is extremely complex, with the expected benefitsdepending
on one's marital status, sex, age-earnings profile, length ofcareer,
number of children, and other factors.
In this paper we simplify the analysis by exclusivelyevaluating
the retirement portion of the program. We examine it from the
perspectives of the individual household, entire cohorts and aggregate
system finances. Our study is partial equilibrium in the sense that we
do not tackle the consequences of the program for labor force
participation, private saving behavior or funding the federal debt. We
compute present values of taxes and benefits using a two percent real
discount rate.2 We also calculate what individuals receive from Social
Security as transfers -thedifference between the present values of
1. This value may very well be enhanced by the fact that the benefitsare
paid out as an inflation adjusted life annuity.
2. See Boskin, icotlikoff, Puffert and Shoven (1987) for a discussion of the
choice of discount rate and sensitivity analyses.
1benefits and taxes. One's transfer is thus the surplusor gain one
receives from participating in the system (if the figure is positive).
Finally, we compute the internal rate of return offered by the
retirement portion of Social Security. That is, we calculate the rate
of discount which equates the expected present value of benefits with
the expected present value of taxes. Throughout the analysis, weassume
the participant bears the burden or effectivelypays both the employer
and the employee contributions to the system.
The long-run financial status of Social Security is quite
uncertain. First, future economic and demographic trends heavily affect
revenues and outlays. Second, except under the Social Security
Administration's optimistic scenario, the retirement part of thesystem
is projected to be in long-run actuarial deficit: small under the
intermediate assumptions; large under the pessimistic ones.Hospital
Insurance (HI) is projected to run a large deficit beginning in the
l990s. Finally, the OASDI system is projected to accrue (under the
intermediate assumptions) a very large surplus over the next thirty
years. This surplus is projected to cumulate to almost 30% of CNP,
close to the current size of the national debt to CNP ratio. This
surplus is "designed" to reduce the need for still larger tax increases
or benefit reductions during the baby boom generation's retirement.
Figure 1 presents estimates of these average annual (not cumulative)
surpluses and deficits in Social Security, including and excluding HI
over the next 75 years to highlight this projected movement away from
pay-as -you-go finance.
We have never been able to accrue a surplus this large in Social
Security; the retirement surplus may well be dissipated for other
purposes (to bail out HI, fund other programs, raise benefits, cut
2taxes, etc.) These possibilities involve major inter-cohort transfers
relative to the intermediate assumptions, as do, ofcourse, the
alternative methods of dealing with the long-run deficit(see Boskin
(1986)). We analyze these in detail below.
The emphasis of the paper is to calculate the financialterms of
Social Security's Old Age and Survivors Insurance for householdsfrom
different birth cohorts under alternative possible futures.Our results
-
indicatethat the "deal" varies substantially by cohort and that
trillions of (real discounted) dollars are at stake for difference
cohorts both in the economic and demographic future of the UnitedStates
and in the use of the projected temporary surplus in the OASItrust
fund.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: the next section
contains a brief survey of related literature. Section 3 describesour
methodology and data. Section 4 presents results using intermediate
assumptions for the overall financial status of the system, the
situation to be faced by successive tenyear birth cohorts (from before
1912 through 1992) and that facing middle incomesingle-earner families
born in each of four years: 1945, 1960, 1975 and 1990. Section5
analyzes the effects of alternative future economic and demographic
patterns. In addition to the standard optimistic and pessimistic Social
Security Administration packages, we also present marginal changes for
fertility, mortality and real wage growth. Section 6 estimates the
implications of alternative uses of the large surplus which is projected
to accrue in OASI's trust fund: what difference it makes, in the
aggregate and to specific cohorts if the surplus is used to raise
benefits or reduce taxes, or is spent on other programs.
3Section 7 presents a brief conclusion which offers a shortsummary
and repeats some caveats concerning interpretation of the results.
The Appendix presents tables which provide detailed data on the
taxes, benefits, transfers and rates of return by cohort and to a
"typical" family for the alternative scenarios considered.
2.Literature Review
Several studies analyze the long-run financial solvency of Social
Security under alternative economic and demographic assumptions. The
most important, of course, are the annual Social Security trustees'
reports (formally, the Annual Reports of the Board of Trustees of the
Old Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds).
They present both short- and long-term actuarial projections of Social
Security trust fund finances under alternative assumptions. The reports
certainly have valuable information, but these data are presented only
as fractions of taxable payroll (except, in one table, as fractions of
GNP); dollar figures (whether discounted or not) are not presented for
long-term projections. More importantly, the reports do not in fact
consider what the state of the retirement (OASI) trust fund might be at
the end of the report's 75 year horizon. Rather it presents the simple
average. over 75 years, of each year's surplus or deficit (that is, tax
receipts minus benefit payments) as a fraction of that year's taxable
payroll. The calculation considers neither the increase over time in
taxable payroll nor the interest earned on the cumulated trust fund
surplus. Thus, the 1986 report's claim that the OASI trust fund is in
"close actuarial balance" because the average annual deficit is only
0.29 percent of taxable payroll is based on a fundamental
4misunderstanding of what that figure means. The report presents no
sufficient basis for evaluating the long-run financialsolvency of Old
Age and Survivors Insurance.3
Boskin's (1986) estimates of the long-run financialsolvency of
OASI avoids these inadequacies by considering annual flows of dollars
and by projecting the actual accumulation and decumulation of the OASI
trust fund. He also considers what will happen if the expected
cumulative surplus of the next three decades is dissipated (forexample,
by raising benefits) or if reforms are instituted in retirementage and
other features.
Several studies have attempted to estimate the "deal" various
households. have received or can expect to receive from SocialSecurity's
retirement program. The general conclusion is that the early cohorts of
retirees had very large rates of return on their taxes and that future
retirees, especially well-off ones, are likely to fare poorly, with a
rate of return below that available on private assets. Hurd and Shoven
(1985) document this pattern of rates of return for various cohorts and
earnings levels, but their analysis was made prior to the 1983
amendments and hence does not include consideration of the increasedage
of eligibility for future retirees or the partial taxation of benefits.
3. In fact, if the report were to present the correct calculation, basedon
the report's own assumptions and methodology, the resulting figures
would be more optimistic under each of the four sets of assumptions
used. A comparison of Tables 10 and F2 in the 1986 report shows that
taxable payroll is projected to rise at a rate slightly below the
assumed interest rate (under each alternative set of assumptions). This
means that the earlier positive annual balances should be given greater
weight than the later negative annual balances. Thus the long-run
actuarial balance should be reported as a little higher.
5Boskin, Avrin and Cone (1983) report the transfer both for
aggregate ten year age cohort and for average households in each cohort.
They also present estimates of how different cohorts and the system
finances as a whole would be affected by various policy changes, such as
increases in the retirement age. They conclude that those retiring
recently are receiving benefits which are about three times as large as
the sum of their employee and employer contributions plus threepercent
real interest, i.e. ,abouttwo-thirds of their benefits are transfers.
These results are updated to take account of the 1983 amendments in
Boskin (1986). The pattern of transfers remains qualitatively similar
to that mentioned above) but attention is called to the fact that OASDI
is unlikely to be financially solvent over the next 75 years, despite
the 1983 amendments. The financial solvency issue is much worse if HI
is included. Boskin emphasizes how and when the financial solvency
issue is addressed -whetherchanges occur in the tax rates, benefit
formulae, the age of eligibility for full retirement benefits, or the
method of financing Social Security.
Pellechio and Coodfellow (1983) examine the net impact of the 1983
amendments on various types of households. Our own analysis of typical
households is similar in spirit to theirs.
Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert and Shoven (1987) present estimates,
ignoring long-run funding issues, for alternative family types and birth
cohorts. They conclude that the deal offered by Social Security varies
substantially, and has not always been better for poorer persons. The
transfers vary by (real discounted) $200,000 per family, amounts which
dwarf the redistributions debated in alternative income tax reforms.
They also note that the marginal linkage between taxes paid and benefits
received is quite low (often zero) and thus Social Security ought to be
6viewed as a tax with the concommitant distortions (e.g.
,inthe labor
market). They also note that considering previously paid taxes a sunk
cost creates a situation in which all but very young workersexpect to
receive back more in benefits than they expect topay in taxes for the
remainder of their work life; thus most people have a stake in
preserving the Social Security system, even though their lifetime
transfers are negative.
Finally, Bernheim (1986) notes an inconsistency in actuarial
discounting and maintaining the strong form of the life-cycle hypothesis
(an average propensity to consume over the lifetime of one). Heargues
that simple discounting may be a good approximation for such
individuals. Since there is considerable evidence thatmany individuals
refuse annuities (e.g., TIA participants are well known toopt for a
certain pension of fixed duration rather than an annuity), and numerous
other studies suggest that lifecycle behavior cannot explain all --or
perhaps most --saving,the applicability of this to the currentpaper
is questionable. Certainly, the population is heterogeneous, and for
some, perhaps simple discounting is appropriate. We discuss these
issues in the caveats in the conclusion.
3. Methodology and Data
The results which we present here are based on computer simulations
of present and future American families covered by the Social Security
system. Our main simulation package derives aggregate discounted
figures for the taxes paid and benefits received by each of nine
successive decadal birth cohorts (a cohort is, for example, all those
born from 1943 to 1952). It simultaneously derives figures for annual
7income to and expenditure from the Social Security Administration's
retirement (that is, OASI) trust fund over the next 75 years.4
This simulation begins with earnings records and other data
concerning Social Security participants who were surveyed in l973.
For subsequent years we estimate participants' earnings based on
demographic characteristics, we derive benefits based on legislated
benefit formulas, and we determine each participant's year of death
through a random process based on mortality tables published by the
Social Security Administration.6
Cohorts born beginning in 1953 are simulated differently. In
considering typical male and female wage earners born each year, we
derive their expected tax and benefit futures based on mortality
probabilities and the proportion that can be expected to marry. We
multiply by the number born each year (plus the number born that year
who later immigrate as children) who will enter covered employment and
thus derive figures for entire cohorts. To derive income and
expenditure for the trust fund as a whole we make a further adjustment
for taxes paid and benefits received by adult immigrants; the totals for
cohorts, however, considers only those covered their entire lives.7
4. For further information on this simulation, or rather on an earlier
version of it, see Boskin, Avrin, and Cone. (1983)
5. The 1975 Social Security Exact Match File merged individual records from
the 1973 Current Population Survey with records of covered earnings.
6. Social Security Administration, Actuarial Study No. 92 (1984).
7. It will be noted that our simulation shows the 1943-1952 cohort faring
rather worse than its successor, although the general pattern is that
succeeding cohorts until about 1960 do progressively worse. The reason
for this is that this cohort is the youngest one for which survey data
are used, and many in this cohort are not yet married. It is well known
that singles fare rather poorly under Social Security, since they have
no option to receive a spouse or survivor benefit rather than a benefit
8The discussion is based on a version of our simulation which
assumes the tax law effective at the time of the Trustees' Report.
Results presented below use the recently enacted income-tax law. Thus,
we project small annual deficits for the trust fund in 1986 and 1987,
while the trust fund is actually now running a small surplus.8
Our simulation goes beyond that of the Social Security
Administration in highlighting not only the financial evolution of the
trust fund but also the impact on successive cohorts of Old Age and
Survivors Insurance, both as currently legislated and as itmay have to
be changed in the future in order to maintain the solvency of the trust
fund.
A second simulation9 looks at the financial impact of Old Age
and Survivors Insurance for a variety of typical families. We use this
simulation to derive the expected value (in an ex-ante calculation which
recognizes the possiblity of death at any age) of a household's social
based on their ownearnings.
8. Ourcalculationis certainly rougher than that undertaken by the
actuarial staff of the Social Security Administration. As a result, we
generate projections of aggregate taxes and benefits which vary from
those of the 1986 Trustee's Report. Between now and 2010 we dervive
less in annual and cumulative surpluses (due to deriving less in tax
receipts) than what the Trustees' Report suggests is likely. Our
figures are close to those of the Trustee's Report in the early 2O1O's
but thereafter until about 2040 we derive greater annual surpluses or
lower deficits than those projected in the Trustee's Report. After 2040
we again generate higher annual deficits.
9. More extensive results from this simulation, but based on the income tax
law in effect until 1986, are presented in Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert
and Shoven (1987) and Boskin and Puffert (1987). The former article
also contains a more extensive description of our methodology.
9security taxes and benefits, and thus its net transfer and real rate of
return.
In the main simulation we rely on Social Security Administration
projections for the proportion of Social Security benefits which are
recovered for the trust fund through income taxation. These estimates
are that this proportion will rise from less than two percent in 1986 to
about five percent in the mid-twenty-first century. Because legislated
marginal tax rates have been reduced since the Social Security
Administration made its projections we assume that, from 1988 on, 20
percent less will be collected in taxes on benefits. In 1987, the
transition year, we assume that 10 percent less will be collected.
In the second simulation we calculate income taxation for each
case, based on the new tax law and data from the Internal Revenue
Service about taxable income of the elderlyJ0
Both of these simulations are parameterized by economic,
demographic, and legal assumptions. The most important economic
assumption is future growth of real wages. The chief demographic
assumptions are mortality probabilities by age and fertility rates. The
legal assumptions are tax rates on payroll and formulae for the
calculation of benefits. In the scenarios below we consider the
alternative economic and demographic assumptions that the Social
Security Administration itself uses for the scenarios in its annual
trustees' reports11, and we consider fixed multiples of the payroll taxes
10. For details, see Boskin, Kottlikof, Puffert and Shoven (1987).
11. We do not consider alternative assumptions for unemployment, female
labor force participation, immigration or real interest rates.
10and the benefits currently legislated.
The present values which we derive assume a real discountrate of
two percent. This is the rate which the SocialSecurity Administration
assumes (in its intermediate assumption) will be realizedon its trust
fund. We apply this rate not only to thesystem's finances, however,
but also to participants in Social Security. Asubsequent section will
discuss arguments that this rate is either too lowor too high when
applied to individualsj2 but we note here one advantage of thisfigure.
When participants can expect a higher rate of returnfrom Social
Security than that received by the trust fund, it must be thecase that
their participation raises the trust fund's unfundedliabilities by the
excess of claims on the trust fund over assets. The amount ofa
cohort's net transfer (discounted benefits minus discountedtaxes) is
the amount by which the trust fund's unfunded liabilitiesrise.
Conversely, a cohort real rate of return below two percent Indicatesa
decrease in the trust fund's unfunded liabilities.
4.Results for Intermediate Assumptions
Table 1 presents the results of our main simulationusing the
Trustees' Report's intermediate assumptions about futureeconomic and
demographic trends. Panel A shows the basic trends, well known bynow,
that are expected to develop in the finances of the OASItrust fund.
12. In previous work (Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert and Shoven(1987)) we and
our colleagues argue for a rate of three percent.
11The trust fund will run a substantial surplus over thenext 25 years
while the baby-boom generation is in its peakearnings years. In the
following 25 years (more precisely, in the mid 2020's) when the baby-
boom generation retires, benefit payments will begin to exceedpayroll-
tax revenues. In the third 25-year period there will be a stillhigher
proportion of retirees to workers, and annual deficits will equal a
fourth of tax receipts, or a fifth of next benefits.
For the whole 75-year period we project a deficit ofnearly $500
billion in 1986 dollars discounted to 1986. This isequal to about 0.44
percent of (discounted) taxable payroll)-3 Thus a rise in the Social
Security payroll tax rate of 0.44 percent effective now, or
substantially more later, would be needed to close the long-run OASI
trust fund deficit if the intermediate assumptionsprove to be the case.
It is worth noting at this point why we present our figures in
discounted terms. First, this enables us to consider thepresent value
of potential futures of the OASI trust fund. This isespecially
valuablee as we compare scenarios with different time paths ofsurpluses
13. This is slightly more than the 0.29 percent long-ten actuarialdeficit
presented in the Trustees' Report. We discussed above how the latter
figure is not very meaningful, and how a calculation comparable to ours
would yield a deficit that is lower in magnitude. A further difference
is that our calculation asssuntes the new, lower marginal tax rates.
Under the old tax law our simulated deficit is about 0.34percent of
taxable payroll. Finally, it should be noted that we make no effort to
calculate the future deficit in disability insurance (DI). The Social
Security Administration calculates this deficit as averaging 0.15
percent of taxable payroll, or half as large as the OASI deficit. The
Social Security Administration total projected OASDI deficit is thus
0.44 percent of taxable payroll. The projected deficit in Hospital
Insurance is another 3.5 percent.
12and deficits. Secondly, it obviates the need to give explicit
consideration to the interest received (or paid out) by the trust fund
on its calculated surplus (or deficit), since we assume that the
interest and discount rates are identical. The present (1986) value of
the surplus or deficit in 2060 will equal the sum of the present values
of annual surpluses and deficits until then. As a corollary, it becomes
very simple to compute how taxes or benefits can or must be changesd to
bring the trust fund into actuarial balance.
The system finances are also presented in Figure 1, where the
discounted surplus both annually and on a cumulative basis for the
system are shown. On a cumulative basis the system starts to run a
deficit (assuming the surplus accrues and real interest is 2 percent)
around 2048, and on an annual basis, around 2025. We present below some
hypothetical scenarios of the surplus being dissipated or alternative
economic and demographic projections which alter these conclusions
substantially.
Table 2 presents results from our simulation of various typical
three different levels of earnings, two division of earnings between
the family members. The figures include expected present value of taxes,
benefits and transfers, and rates of return discounted both to the age
when the couples are 25 (for the purposes of comparision) and to 1986.
The discounted present value of transfers (and therefore, taxes and
benefits in general) varies markedly within each age cohort for
different levels of earnings (reflecting the progress ivity of the
benefit formulae) and income splits (with respect to the spousal
benefit), and to a lesser extent, the ceiling on taxable earnings. For
example, persons recently entering the system, born in 1960, have a
13present value of transfers that ranges from a slight positive transfer
for low income earners to a substantial negative transfer for high-
income earners. The rates of return for taxes paid range from 3.4% for
the low-income single-earner family to 0.4% for the high income two-
earner family. The same pattern is repeated within each cohort. The
intragenerational redistributions are explored in much greater detail in
Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert and Shoven (1987).
The financial patterns for successive decadel cohorts born through
1992 are presented in panel b of Table 1. Retiree taxes, net benefits
(i.e., net of income taxation), the transfer received by those who live
to retire, and the taxes paid by nonsurvivors, together with the real
rates of return are presented. As can be seen, even those due to be
born in the immediate future are likely to get a slightly positive
transfer, computed at a 2 percent real rate of return. Thus, the rates
of return which are about 2 percent or more, indicate positive
transfers. Were we to use 3 percent, cohorts born after 1933 would be
receiving negative transfers.
Of course, since there is a long-run actuarial deficit of 0.44% of
taxable payroll, amounting in present value to approximately 500 billion
dollars, someone will have to pay it. The base case assumes that it is
paid by persons born after 1992, whose situation will be correspondingly
worse. We present information on how this varies for different rates of
return.
Thus, while we will primarily be dealing in the sequel with system
totals and aggregates by age cohorts, substantial variation remains
within each age cohort, and that variation will vary systematically as
we change economic and demographic assumptions and consider alternative
scenarios for dissipation of the surplus. In what follows we will
14present only the situation for a typical middle income family with one
earner, a group which systematically earns a rate of return very close
to 2% cohort by cohort (see Table 2), rather than present a largestring
of negative numbers for the well-off two-earner couple ora long string
of substantial positive numbers for low income one-earnercouples. We
will focus on this case to see how one-earner middle income couples'
situations vary depending on the alternative scenarios. We do this to
reduce the system aggregate finances and the aggregate cohort amounts
for the cohorts to a per family basis. The heterogeneity thatcertainly
lies behind each of these scenarios should be borne in mind.
5.Financial Impacts of Alternative Future Economic and Demographic
Patterns
The Social Security Administration's intermediate economic and
demographic assumptions are perhaps as reasonable as any, but we can be
sure that they will not be realized with great accuracy.14 It is thus
important to consider the impacts of a range of possible futures both on
the Social Security system's finances and on participants.
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the effects of using the Social Security
Administration's optimistic and pessimistic assumptions for futurewage
growth, future mortality (and hence, life expectancy), future fertility
and various combinations of these parameters. Table 4 shows the wide
14. For an analysis of the inaccuracy of the economic and demographib
assumptions used in the past, see United States General Accounting
Office (1986).
15variation in results for the financial solvency of the retirement trust
fund. The present (1986) value of the trust fund surplus (or deficit)
in 2060 ranges from +$3.4 trillion to -$2.6 trillion, for the combined
optimistic and pessimistic assumptions respectively.15 We see in the
column headed "year annual deficit begins" that only when the optimistic
assumptions are combined do tax receipts exceed benefit expenditures in
each year through 2060; otherwise current-flow deficits begin between
2014 and 2030. In the next column we see that the cumulative surplus
suffices, however, to cover benefit expenditures until 2024 in the most
pessimistic scenario and beyond 2060 in several of the optimistic
scenarios.
Table 4 compares the rates of return realized by each of the nine
decadal birth cohorts under the alternative scenarios. We note first
that, for later cohorts, the derived real rates of returnvary among
scenarios from about one and one-half percent to over three percent.
In order to understand more closely how taxes, benefits, transfers,
and rates of return vary by scenario and cohort, let us now consider in
detail how each of our economic and demographic assumptions affects both
the finances of the Social Security retirement trust fund and the taxes
and benefits of those covered by Social Security. The figures discussed
below concerning the Social Security Administration's optimistic and
pessimistic scenarios are presented in still greater detail in Appendix
15. lJndiscounted, but still in 1986 dollars, the respective figures are
+$l4.7 trillion and -$11.1 trillion. Subsequent figures are also
presented in discounted terms. To remove discounting, multiply by 4.33.
16Tables A.l and A.2.
The Social Security Administration's intermediate (Il-B)assumption
for growth in real wages, used in our base case, is that there will be
an annual gain of one and one-half percent (with some fluctuation in the
very short run). The optimistic assumption considers a gain of two and
one-half percent annually, and the pessimistic assumption considersa
gain of one percent.
Interestingly, higher wage growth is better both for the system's
finances and for participants in the system. An increase in the trust
fund's annual surplus (taxes minus benefits) proves consistent witha
higher ratio of benefits received to taxes paid for the participants.
The reason for this is that increases in taxes, whichvary with total
wages, precede the increases in benefits to which wage growth leads.
The wage index is used in the formula for determining benefits, andso a
faster rise in this index provides a higher rate of return for
participants. What "balances the books" is a growth in the unfunded
liabilities of the retirement trust fund. These liabilities could
become quite burdensome if wage growth slows in the future.
We see in Table 3 that variation in wage growth changes taxes and
benefits in the same direction, but that taxes change to.a greater
extent. High wage growth increases the long-run surplus by $1.37
trillion, more than offsetting the long-run deficit expected under the
base case. Low wage growth deepens the long-run deficit by about $450
billion.
Higher (lower) wage growth increases (decreases) both taxes and
benefits. It increases (decreases) annual flows of taxes more than
benefits but, for a given cohort, increases (decreases) discounted
benefits more than discounted taxes. Rates of return for later cohorts
17(also presented in Table 4) vary from about 2.2 percent under
intermediate wage growth to about 2.8 percent under high wage growth and
1.9 percent under low wage growth.
In assumptions about mortality, what is "optimistic" for the
solvency of the retirement trust fund is "pessimistic" for participants,
and vice versa. The trust fund is more solvent when people die sooner
and collect less in benefits. Table 3 shows that under the Social
Security Administration's high mortality (low life expectancy)
assumption the trust fund is better off by $963 billion over the 75-year
horizon, but that under the low mortality assumption the system is worse
off by $1.20 trillion. In Table 4 we see that for later cohorts the
rates of return are about 1.9 percent for high mortality and 2.7percent
for low mortality. Higher (lower) mortality reduces (raises) benefits
much more than taxes for any cohort, as indeed for the trust fund's
annual flow as well.
Alternative assumptions about fertility matter only for those cohorts
not yet born, which are not presented in our tables. However, because
Social Security participatits begin paying taxes some fortyyears before
they receive benefits, fertility rates will have a big impact on trust
fund finances in the next century)6 Indeed, today's low fertility
rates are the most widely cited source of probable future problems in
Social Security finance. Current fertility rates are about 1.9 children
per woman over her child-bearing years. The Social Security
16. The level of immigration, especially of young people, will have an
impact for the same reason. We leave this matter for future
investigation.
18Administration's intermediate assumption is that this will risewithin
the next two decades to 2.0 childrenper woman. The optimistic and
pessimistic assumptions are 2.3 and 1.6 respectively.17 The results of
our simulation, shown in Table 3, are that high fertility would add $694
billion to the trust fund surplus, more than eliminating what is
otherwise a deficit, while low fertility would add $837 billionto the
deficit.
We also derived results for scenarios which combine sets of
optimistic and pessimistic assumptions. The assumptions which are
optimistic for participants are high wage growth and low mortality
(fertility being irrelevant), while the assumptions which are optimistic
for trust fund finances are high wage growth, high mortality, andhigh
fertility. In the scenarios which are optimistic and pessimistic for
participants, rates of return for later cohorts are about 3.3 percent
and 1.6 percent respectively. Comparing Appendix Tables A.9 and A.lO,
we see that under the combined optimistic assumptions today'syoung
children will pay a little more than twice as much in taxes as they
would under the combined pessimistic assumptions, but they will receive
nearly four times as much in benefits. The effects on system finances
are offsetting and do not differ greatly from the base case.
17. In our simulation we use the Social Security Administration's figures
for number of births each calendar year, which are derived from these
fertility rates. It should be noted that the fertility rates used by
the Social Security Administration refer to "the average number of
children who would be born to a woman in her lifetime if she were to
experience the birth rates by age observed in, or assumed for, the
selected year and if she were to survive the entire child-bearing
period."
19Under the combined optimistic and pessimisticassumptions for trust
fund finances the differences from the intermediatescenario for long-
run surplus are +$3.88 trillion and -$2.07 trillion (Table 3). The
present value of taxes differs between these extreme scenarios bya
factor of nearly two, while benefitsvary by a factor of about 1.3.
Figure 3 shows how the size of the accumulated trust fund varies
over the next 75 years for the overall optimistic, intermediate (base
case), and pessimistic scenarios. Note that the continuing increasein
the trust fund occurs only when the optimisticassumptions occur
simultaneously. For any one of the optimistic assumptions alone,
interest on the trust fund is eventually insufficient tocover the
difference between current benefits and currenttaxes, and the principal
itself is exhausted before 2090 (Table 3, last column).
6.Financial Impact of Alternative Uses of the Potential TrustFund
Surplus
We noted in the previous section that only under the combinedoptimistic
assumptions for wage growth, mortality, and fertility all togethercan
we hope that the retirement trust fund will take in at least as much
each year in taxes as it pays out in benefits. In all othercases an
accumulation in the trust fund is vital in order to forestall the time
when taxes must be raised or benefits reduced)8 Under intermediate
18. Of course, the consumption of theeconomy as a whole is limited by what
is produced, by those still living. Thus, in some sense SocialSecurity
benefits must always be funded at the time they are paid. Still, the
method of financing Social Security determines who has what claims, and
this has important implications both for equity and efficiency.
20assunptions, for example, an annual deficit will begin in 2025 but the
accumulated surplus will keep the trust fund solvent until 2048.
Unfortunately it has always proved difficult, for political
reasons, to accumulate a trust fund surplus. It is in the interest of
each session of Congress, and each administration, to raise benefits(or
perhaps to lower taxes, although that has not yet been tried) if
possible. Raising benefits conveys transfers to those receiving, or
soon to receive, benefits while imposing much of the cost of the action
on future generations which do not yet vote. Lowering taxes, similarly,
helps a current generation of workers while requiring higher taxes from
future generations than would otherwise be necessary.
The situation is now particularly acute for a major demographic
reason: in less than 30 years the baby-boom generation will begin to
retire. If we do not preserve the accumulation of a trust fund surplus
before then, future adjustments in payroll-tax rates or in benefits will
have to be much greater than would otherwise benecessary.
Figure 4 depicts the combined (employer and employee) tax rates
which would be required each year to fund currently-legislated benefits
(given intermediate assumptions) without adding to or drawing upon an
accumulated surplus. Until 202519 tax rates could be lowerthan
those currently legislated, but thereafter they would rise drastically.
19. The higher tax rate shown for 2022 is a quirk resulting from the way our
simulation handles the rise in retirement age, from 66 to 67, which
occurs around that time. We stimulate the change as occuring all at
once rather than phased in over several years.
21Conversely, Figure 5 shows the level of benefits which could be
funded by each year's tax receipts. This level ispresented in the form
of a ratio to benefits as provided for under currentlegislation. We
see that benefits could be raised intermittently through 2009, toa
level 30 percent higher than that now legislated, but thatthereafter
they must either decline or, perhaps more plausible politically, be
maintained through increases in payroll tax rates. Thetax rates
required to finance these increased benefits are depicted in the
broken line of Figure 4.
Tables 5 and 6 summarize the financial impacts of severalways of
dissipating the trust-fund surplus which is projected togrow over the
next 35 to 40 years. "Pay-as-you-go tax rates" considers thescenario
in which, beginning in 1990, tax rates are set eachyear at a level
which exactly covers that year's benefitpayments. Similarily, "pay-as-
you-go benefits" considers, also for 1990 on, the adjustment of benefit
levels to match projected tax receipts. The tax ratesand benefits
levels of these scenarios thus follow the hea-vy linesdepicted in
Figures 4 and 5 respectively.
We consider 1990 a plausible starting date for thesescenarios
because the party that takes office in 1989 will beglad to endear
itself to the voters before the 1990 congressional election.By this
time the annual surplus in the trust fund will bean inviting target.
The "benefit ratchet" scenarios consider the cases in which
benefits rise to their pay-as-you-go peak in 2009 but do not
subsequently decline. The first of these scenarios notes the enormous
deficit ($3.69 trillion cununulative by 2060) generated when thehigher
benefit level is not funded with taxes, while the second considers the
case of taxes rising, in a pay-as-you-go fashion, to fund the increased
22benefits.
The last two of these scenarios consider what will happen if the
surplus which would accumulate over the next forty years is dissipated,
or directed to other purposes. Two very plausible possibilities for
this are that the surplus could be used to cover some of the massive
deficit in Social Security Hospital Insurance which will (absent a major
reform) develop within a few years2° or that the surplus will, in the face
of federal budget deficits, be used to fund other expenditures. The
first of these scenarios raises taxes in a pay-as-you-go fashion
beginning in 2025, the first year in which current benefit payments
exceed current tax receipts. The second of these scenarios reduces
benefits in a pay-as-you-go fashion from 2025 on. Thus these scenarios
are equivalent to the earlier pay-as-you-go scenarios from 2025 on; they
only lack the period in which tax or else benefit levels are more
favorable for participants than the levels currently legislated.
The chief result for system finances (Table 5) under all these
scenarios --except,of course, the unfunded ratcheting of benefits --
isthat the long run surplus is, by construction, essentially
zero.21 Thestory for the successive cohorts, as we see in Table 6
and more extensively in Appendix Tables A.3 through A.8, is that some
gain and some lose as a result of these changes.
Thus under pay-as-you-go tax rates, those born until the 1980's
20. In practice, it is more likely that part of OASI's portion of payroll
tax will be reallocated to HI. The analysis of OASI finances would then be
similar to that of our pay-as-you-go taxrate scenario.
21. A deficit of $8 billion appears for some scenarios due to our simulation
showing a slight overall deficit between 1986 and 1989.
23gain; the bulk of their working lives take place before 2025, when tax
rates must rise above those currently legislated. The big losers under
this scenario are those born in the nextcentury, who will be subject to
payroll tax rates of over 13 percent by 2033 (and later over 14
percent), rather than the 10.98 percent currently legislated.
Under pay-as-you-go benefits, those who receive benefitsmostly
before 2025 gain. Those born from the l950'son, who collect their
benefits after 2025, will do worse than projected under current
legislation. Those born today can expect a benefit reduction of 23
percent, for a rate of return of only about 1.5 percent.
With a ratcheting of benefits financed by tax increases, thoseborn
until the present decade gain, as their increase in benefitsmore than
offsets the increase in taxes which theypay during part of their
working lives. But later cohorts bear the full brunt of these increased
tax rates (17 percent by 2033, and higher later, compared to 10.98
percent currently legislated) and hence do substantially worse overall.
When the surplus is dissipated, there are no gaining cohorts.
But those who pay taxes or collect benefits after 2025 suffer thesame
losses as in the first two pay-as-you-go scenarios.
7. Conclusion and Caveats
The results reported in this research suggest that Social
Security's retirement program offers vastly different terms to
households in different circumstances and in different cohorts. More
importantly, (net of any private intrafamily intergenerational transfers
which offset Social Security benefit payments, which we believe to be a
modest fraction of the total benefits) if we do not maintain a large
24OASI trust fund, the alternative scenarios for return topay-as-you-go
finance differ dramatically in the taxes, benefits, transfers andreal
rates of return which can be offered to different birth cohorts.
While it appears that the retirement part of Social Security--
butnot hospital insurance -- isin sound short-run financial shape and
indeed, is projected to accummulate a very substantial surplus over the
next 35 to 40 years under intermediate economic and demographic
assumptions, various factors could intervene in this relativelyrosy
short-run scenario. We have attempted to explore some plausible
alternatives to the surplus accruing: tax could be cut, benefits
increased, or the surplus diverted to other purposes. We have traced
their implications for the overall financial status of thesystem, the
time pattern of taxes, benefits and surpluses or deficits, and
therefore, the treatment of different age cohorts. Under the
intermediateassumptions, the Social Security surplus is proj ected to
become almost as large as today's regular national debt. Obviously,
wellbefore thiswould occur, enormous pressure would be placed on
financial markets. Since Hospital Insurance is scheduled to be accruing
a substantial deficit well before the surplus peaks, one likely scenario
is that Social Security will "borrow" from the retirement fund to bail
out the hospital insurance fund. The retirement surplus also could be a
signal to fiscal authorities that additional spending could be financed
on other programs, ignoring the simultaneously accruing future
liabilities in Social Security. The surplus could be dissipated if the
prospective increase in the retirement age is reduced, eliminated, or
postponed; and/or if the tax exempt amount is indexed. In all of these
situations, the short-run surplus would decrease substantially, and the
subsequent long-run deficit would worsen. The exact pattern of tax
25collections and benefit payments might take avariety of forms, but each
of these would lead to a much worse deal for retirees inthe distant
future versus current retirees or those retiring in thenear future.
The Social Security retirement system finances arequite sensitive
to alternative economic and demographic events. We havepresented
estimates based upon the Social Security Administration'spessimistic
and optimistic packages, but also "unpackaged" themso that we may
examine the marginal effect of changing mortality,fertility, and wage
growth assumptions. Again, the patterns are revealing. Except in the
optimistic package, the discounted value of the SocialSecurity
retirement system fund over the next 75 years isnegative, and is
subject to substantial potential negative shocks for thereasons
discussed above.
We have mentioned a number of caveats to our resultsthroughout the
paper. First, the new income tax law is certain to change over the time
horizon we examine and probably sooner rather than later.Marginal
rates may change, Social Security benefitsmay be taxed fully, some or
all of the tax collections from the taxation of SocialSecurity benefits
may accrue to general funds to help pay for deficits rather than be
credited to Social Security at the time of surplus, etc.Second, we
mentioned that the value of Social Security benefitsmay exceed their
expected present value because they are paid as inflation-adjustedjoint
survivor life annuties. Exactly how to make the adjustments isunclear.
Bernheim (1986) argues that a strict adherence to thelife-cycle model -
- atleast the aspect of it that implies anaverage propensity to
consume, over one's lifetime, of one --andimperfections in annuity
markets imply that actuarial discounting is inappropriate, andargues
26that simple discounting may be desirable. While we do not hold to this
extreme form of the life-cycle model in this paper and there is
substantial evidence that if individuals are given the option, they
refuse to annuitize their wealth (for example, college professors
covered by TIA usually decline annuitization in favor of some years
certain in their retirement pension), we do not believe that simple
discounting is a sensible alternative to actuarial discounting for the
whole population. However, to the extent that a fraction of the
population we consider is appropriately considered as pure life-cycle
savers and subject to the imperfections in annuity markets, some method
of aggregating heterogeneous individuals within cohorts is desirable and
perhaps some convex combination of actuarial and simple discounting
would be necessary. Simple discounting would alter the benefits and
taxes only a few percentage points, given a real discount rate of 2
percent or 3 percent. Again, we would argue that these factors should
be applied only to some fraction of the population, not the entire
population. For the system totals, such adjustments are unnecessary;
indeed, they only make sense for examining the individual cases rather
than the system aggregate totals.
Related questions revolve around comparing taxes paid earlier in
life and benefits received later in life. Taxes might be paid at a time
in life when households are constrained in liquidity; Social Security
benefits may be systematically subject to different types of risks than
labor earnings or returns from assets. Hence, the taxes may be
differentially risky since they are paid on realized earnings during
working years relative to Social Security benefits. Again, these issues
have been discussed in more detail elsewhere (see Boskin and Shoven
(1985)).
27Thus, some risk adjustment may be necessary. Some have even
suggested that the appropriate discount rate should be zero because
Social Security benefits really are a safe asset and that is close to
the real return on government securities (safe assets) over thelong-
term (Henry Aaron, Alicia Munnell and others have made this argument).
First, adjusting for differences in risk other than mortality risk by
adjusting discount rates is inappropriate. Modern finance theory
teaches that a charge for risk should be assigned in theappropriate
period and the appropriate measure of net adjusted benefits should then
be discounted at the rate of time preference. Second, it is unclear
whether Social Security benefits or earnings or the returns to other
assets are differentially risky. Indeed, it is not just their inherent
risk but their covariance with other components of income for households
which would determine the nature of the risk charge to be applied. For
persons already retired, one would expect that uncertainty would be
relatively modest; for those due to retire in the distant future, there
is substantial uncertainty regarding the level of such SocialSecurity
payments. This stems from the Social Security system's long-ten
financial solvency problems as well as the desire ofmany to means-test
the program fully. Thus, well-off individualsmay wind up getting
nothing in the future as the way to deal with the financial solvency
problem. We merely point these issues out for the interested reader and
refer them to the other papers mentioned for further discussion, but
these caveats should be borne in mind in interpreting the results
reported here.
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Base Case (Intermediate Assumption)
A. FINANCIAL FLOWS OF OASI TRUST FUND
1986$BILLIONS, DISCOUNTED TO 1986
SURPLUS/
TIMEPERIOD PAYROLL TAXES BENEFITSBEN TAXESa SURPLUS PAYROLL
1986 TO 2010 39584 4366 3997114 (141) 483 1.22%
2011TO 2035 38540 4232 4422158 (198) -31 -0.08%
2036 TO 2060 34460 3784 4925196 (244) -946 -2.74%
1986 To 2060 112584 12381 13344468 (584) -495 -0.44%
B. FINANCIALPATTERNS FOR BIRTH-YEAR COHORTS
1986 $BILLIONS, DISCOUNTED TO 1986
RETIREEb NET NONSURVIVOR REAL RATE
Year of Birth TAXES BENEFITSCTRANSFER TAXESd OF RETURN
BEFORE 1912 385 3671 3286 186 11.61%
1913 TO 1922 489 1582 1093 121 5.74%
1923TO 1932 776 1508 732 149 3.72%
1933 TO 1942 952 1446 495 193 2.75%
1943TO 1952 1378 1695 316 340 1.96%
1953 TO 1962 1525 2040 515 350 2.31%
1963 To 1972 1414 1809 395 325 2.17%
1973 TO 1982 1287 1660 373 283 2.22%
1983 To 1992 1337 1751 413 282 2.28%
C.EXPECTED VALUES FORMIDDLE- INCOME SINGLE- EARNER COUPLES
(1986 dollars, discounted to 1986)
Year of Birth of Couple
1945 1960 1975 1990
PresentValue Benefits 161,460 140,255 133,714 122,097
Present Value Taxes 144,950 149,825 139,859 128,581
Present Value Transfer 16,510 -9,510 -6,145 -6,484
Rate of Return 2.34% 1.80% 1.87% 1.85%
Notes: a. Income taxation of benefits. Figures in parentheses refer to old tax law.
b. Payroll taxes paid by those who survive to collect benefits.
c. Benefits net of income taxation.
4. Payroll taxes paid by those who do not survive to collect benefits.Table 2
Financial Patterns for Various Typical Families-BaseCase
(Expected values in 1986 dollars, discounted at realrate of 2%)
Family Earnings Level:
Division of Earnings;
Low ($10,000) Middle ($30,000) High ($50,000) 1-0 1/2-1/2 1-0 1/2-1/2 1-0 1/2-1/2
I. 1945 Cohort
Discounting to 1970:
Present Value Benefits 65,45552,881 117,616 96,723 113,314 119,920 Present Value Taxes 37,01536,171 105,589 108,514 112.421 178,237 Present Value Transfers 28,44016,710 12,027 -11,791 893 -58,317
Discounting to 1986:
Present Value Benefits 89,85472,594 161,460132,778 155,554 164,624 Present Value Taxes 50,81349,655 144,950148,965 154,329 244,679 Present Value Transfers 39,04122,939 16,510 -16,187 1,225 -80,055
Rate of Return 3.73% 3.17% 2.34% 1.64% 2.03% 0.75%
II. 1960 Cohort
Discounting to 1985:
Present Value Benefits 78,40362,949 137,505112,811 137,129 141,828 Present Value Taxes 48,96347,833 146,888143,499 170,004 239,165 Present Value Transfer 29,44015,116 -9,383-30,688 -32,875 -97,337
Discounting to 1986:
Present Value Benefits 79,97164,207 140,255115.067 139,871 144,664 Present Value Taxes 49,94248,790 149.825146,369 173,404 243,949 Present Value Transfer 30,02915,417 -9,570-31,302 -33,533 -99,285
Rate of Return 3.39% 2.82% 1.80% 1.27% 1.37% 0.40%cont. of Table 2
Financial Patterns for Various Typical Families -BaseCase
(Expected values in 1986 dollars, discounted at real rate of 2%)
Family Earnings Level:
Division of Earnings:
Low ($10,000) Middle ($30,000) gh ($50,000) 1-0 1/2-1/2 1-0 1/2-1/2 1-0 1/2-1/2 III. 1975 Cohort
Discounting to 2000:
Present Value Benefits 96,61677,388 176,432144,978 175,842 182,174 Present Value Taxes 61,61460,078 184,540180.232 214,567 300,387 Present Value Transfers 35,10217,310 -8,108 -35,254 -38,725 -118,213
Discounting to 1986:
Present Value Benefits 73,22458,651 133,714109,876 133,267 138,066 Present Value Taxes 46,62045,532 139,859136,594 162,616 227,657 Present Value Transfers 26,60413,119 -6,145 -26,718 -29,349 -89,591
Rate of Return 3.31% 2.75% 1.87% 1.35% 1.43% 0.49%
IV. 1990 Cohort
Discounting to 2015:
Present Value Benefits 123,21898,859 216,823177,840 221,189 229,261 Present Value Taxes 76,11274,285 228,337222,856 265,328 371,427 Present Value Transfer 47,10624.574 -11,514-45,016 -44,139 -142,166
Discounting to 1986:
Present Value Benefits 69,38755,669 122,097100,145 124,556 129,102 Present Value Taxes 42,86041,832 128,581125,495 149,412 209,158 Present Value Transfer 26,52713,837 -6,484-25,350 -24,856 -80,056


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Overall Optimistic Scenario for Trust Fund
A. FINANCIAL FLOWS OF OASI TRUST FUND
1986$RILLIONS, DISCOUNTED TO 1986
SURPLUS
TIME PERIOD PAYROLL TAXES BENEFITSBEN TAXE? SURPLUS PAYROLL
1986 TO 2010 44698 4930 3909 112 1133 2.54%
2011 TO 2035 57150 6275 5328 191 1139 1.99%
2036 TO 2060 72604 7972 7138 284 1117 1.54%
1986TO 2060 174452 19177 16376 587 3389 1.94%
B. FINANCIALPATTERNS FOR BIRTH-YEAR COHORTS
1986 $BILLIONS, DISCOUNTED TO 1986
RETIREEB NET NONStJRVIVORd REAL RATE
Year of Birth TAXES BENEFITSCTRANSFER TAXESOF RETURN
BEFORE 1912 389 3477 3087 180 11.50%
1913To 1922 493 1497 1004 116 5.60%
1923 To 1932 750 1514 764 168 3.77%
1933 To 1942 963 1580 617 214 2.98%
1943 To 1952 1517 2001 484 377 2.18%
1953 TO 1962 1716 2585 869 451 2.62%
1963 TO 1972 1724 2498 774 462 2.47%
1973 TO 1982 1730 2520 789 452 2.50%
1983 TO 1992 2055 3022 967 523 2.55%
C. EXPECTED VALUES FORMIDDLE-INCOME SINGLE-EARNER COUPLES
(1986dollars, discounted to 1986)
Year of Birth of Couple
1945 1960 1975 1990
Present Value Benefits 177,382 175,680 189,049 206,122
Present Value Taxes 153,492 176,518 190,083 202,926
Present Value Transfer 23,890 -838 -1,034 3,196
Rate of Return 2.48% 1.98% 1.98% 2.05%
Notes: a. Income taxation of benefits.
b. Payroll taxes paid by those who survive to collect benefits.
c. Benefits net of income taxation.
d. Payroll taxes paid by those who do not survive to collect benefits.Table A.2
Overall Pessimistic Scenario for Trust Fund
A. FINANCIAL FLOWSOFOASI TRUST FUND
1986$BILLIONS, DISCOUNTED TO 1986
SURPLUS
TIME PERIOD PAYROLL TAXES BENEFITSBEN TAXESa SURPLUS PAYROLL
1986 TO 2010 36597 4036 3987 114 163 0.44%
2011 TO 2035 30288 3326 4232 152 -755 -2.49%
2036 TO 2060 20795 2283 4434 176 -1975 -9.50%
1986TO 2060 87679 9644 12653 441 -2567 -2.93%
B. FINANCIALPATrERNS FORBIRTH-YEARCOHORTS
1986$BILLIONS, DISCOUNTED TO 1986
RETIREE., NET NONSURVIVORd REAL RATE. Year of Birth TAXES BENEFITSC TRANSFER TAXESOF RETURN
BEFORE 1912 401 3729 3329 174 11.66%
1913 TO 1922 522 1646 1123 103 5.78%
1923 TO 1932 749 1509 759 175 3.69%
1933 TO 1942 941 1400 458 179 2.70%
1943 TO 1952 1423 1706 283 251 2.06%
1953TO 1962 1457 1924 466 264 2.37%
1963 TO 1972 1303 1662 359 222 2.29%
1973 TO 1982 1135 1474 338 175 2.37%
1983 TO 1992 1073 1424 351 149 2.46%
C. EXPECTED VALUES FORMIDDLE-INCOME SINGLE-EARNER COUPLES
(1986dollars, discounted to 1986)
Year of Birth of Couple
1945 1960 1975 1990
Present Value Benefits 156,901 134.791 118,899 107,208
Present Value Taxes 139,419 135,729 117,675 100,761
Present Value Transfer 17,482 -938 1,225 6,447
Rate of Return 2.36% 1.98% 2.03% 2.17%
Notes: a. Income taxation of benefits.
b. Payroll taxes paid by those who survive to collect benefits.
c. Benefits net of income taxation.
d. Payroll taxes paid by those whodonot survive to collect benefits.Table A.3
Pay-As-You-Go Tax Rates
A. FINANCIAL FLOWSOFOASI TRUST FUND
1986$BILLIONS, DISCOUNTED TO 1986
SURPLUS
TIMEPERIOD PAYROLL TAXES BENEFITSBEN TAXE? SURPLUS PAYROLL
1986 TO 2010 39584 3875 3997 114 -8 -0.02%
2011TO 2035 38540 4263 4422 158 0 0.00%
2036 TO 2060. 34460 4730 4925 196 0 0.00%
1986 TO 2060 112584 12868 13344 468 -8 -0.01%
B. FINANCIAL PATTERNS FOR BIRTH-YEAR COHORTS
1986 $BILLIONS, DISCOUNTED TO 1986
RETIREEb NET NONSURVIVORd REAL RATE
Year of Birth TAXES BENEFITSCTRANSFER . TAXESOF RETURN
BEFORE 1912 385 3671 3286 186 11.61%
1913 TO 1922 489 1582 1093 121 5.74%
1923 TO 1932 770 1508 739 149 3.73%
1933TO 1942 917 1446 529 190 2.84%
1943 TO 1952 1277 1695 418 324 2.17%
1953 TO 1962 1398 2040 642 321 2.56%
1963 TO 1972 1332 1809 477 296 2.37%
1973 TO 1982 1284 1660 376 270 2.26%
1983 TO 1992 1441 1751 309 293 2.09%
C.EXPECTED VALUES FOR MIDDLE- INCOME SINGLE EARNER COUPLES
(1986dollars, discounted to 1986)
Year of Birth of Couple
1945 1960 1975 1990
* * * * PresentValue Benefits 161,460 140,255 133,714 122,097
Present Value Taxes 135,689 136,580 136,663 143,260
Present Value Transfer 25,771 3,675 -2,947 -21,163
Rate of Return 2.53% 2.08% 1.93% 1.51%
Notes: a: Income taxation of benefits.
b: Payroll taxes paid by those who survive to collect benefits.
c: Benefits net of income taxation.
: Payroll taxes paid by those who do not survive to collect benefits.
Sameas Base Case.Table A.4
Pay-As -You-Go Benefits
A.FINANCIAL FLOWS OF OASI TRUST FUND
1986$BILLIONS, DISCOUNTED TO 1986




B. FINANCIALPATTERNS FOR BIRTH-YEAR COHORTS






Notes: a: Income taxation of benefits.
b: Payroll taxes paid by those who survive to collect benefits.
c: Benefits net of income taxation.
g:Payrolltaxes paid by those who do not survive to collect benefits.











1986 TO2010 39584 4366 4504
2011 TO2035 38540 4232 4388
2036 TO2060 34460 3784 3940
1986 TO2060 112584 12381 12832
Year ofBirth RETIREEb TAXES
NET
BENEFITSc
BEFORE1912 385 3729 3344 186 11.62%
1913 TO1922 489 1702 1213 121 5.94%
1923 To1932 776 1722 946 149 4.16%
1933 TO1942 952 1640 688 193 3.18%
1943 tO1952 1378 1696 317 340 1.96%
1953 TO1962 1525 1768 244 350 1.89%
1963 TO1972 1414 1463 49 325 1.56%
1973 TO1982 1287 1308 21 283 1.54%
1983 TO1992 1337 1348 11 282
NONSURVIVORREAL RATE
TRANSFER TAXESd OF RETURN
C. EXPECTED VALUES FOR MIDDLE -INCOMESINGLE- EARNER COUPLES
(1986dollars, discounted to 1986)

















A. FINANCIAL FLOWS OF OASI TRUST FUN!)
1986 $BILLIONS, DISCOUNTED TO 1986
SURPLUS
TIMEPERIOD PAYROLL TAXES BENEFITSBEN TAXESa SURPLUS PAYROLL
1986 TO 2010 39584 4366 4511 130 -15 -0.04%
2011 TO 2035 38540 4232 5748 206 -1311 -3.40%
2036 TO 2060 34460 3784 6403 254 -2365 -6.86%
1986 TO 2060 112584 12381 16662 591 -3690 -3.28%
B. FINANCIAL PATTERNS FOR BIRTh-YEAR COHORTS
1986 $BILLIONS, DISCOUNTED TO 1986
RETIREE.0 NET NONSURVIVORd REAL RATE Year of Birth TAXES BENEFITSCTRANSFER TAXESOF RETURN
BEFORE 1912 385 3730 3346 186 11.62%
1913 TO 1922 489 1713 1224 121 5.95%
1923 TO 1932 776 1782 1006 149 4.25%
1933 TO 1942 952 1840 889 193 3.50%
1943 TO 1952 1378 2203 825 340 2.75%
1953 To 1962 1525 2652 1127 350 3.07%
1963 TO 1972 1414 2351 937 325 2.92%
1973 TO 1982 1287 2158 871 283 2.96%
1983 TO 1992 1337 2276 939 282 3.02%
Notes: a: Income taxation of benefits.
b: Payroll taxes paid by those who survive to collect benefits.
C:Benefitsnet of income taxation.
d: Payroll taxes paid by those who do not survive to collect benefits.Table A.6
Benefit Ratchet1 Funded by taxes
A. FINANCIAL FLOWS OF OASI TRUST FUND
1986 $BILLIOHS, DISCOUNTED TO 1986
SURPLUS
TIME PERIOD PAYROLL TAXES BENEFITSBEN TAXESa SURPLUS PAYROLL
1986 TO 2010 39584 4373 4511 130 -8 -0.02%
2011 TO 2035 38540 5542 5748 206 0 0.00%
2036 TO 2060 34460 6149 6403 254 0 0.00%
1986 TO 2060 112584 16064 16662 591 -8 -0.01%
B.FINANCIAL PATTERNS FOR BIRTH-YEAR COHORTS
1986 $BILLIONS, DISCOUNTED TO 1986
RETIREE.0 NET NONSURVIVOR REAL RATE Year of Birth TAXES BENEFITSCTRANSFER TAXESd OF RETURN
BEFORE 1912 385 3730 3346 186 11.62%
1913 TO 1922 489 1713 1224 121 5.95%
1923TO 1932 776 1782 1006 149 4.25%
1933 TO 1942 952 1840 889 193 3.50%
1943 TO 1952 1390 2203 813 341 2.73%
1953 TO 1962 1611 2652 1041 359 2.95%
1963 TO 1972 1622 2351 730 354 2.58%
1973 TO 1982 1634 2158 524 342 2.33%
1983 TO 1992 1871 2276 405 380 2.09%
C.EXPECTED VALUES FOR MIDDLE-INCOME SINGLE-EARNER COUPLES
(1986 dollars, discounted to 1986)
Year of Birth of Couple
1945 1960 1975 1990
Present Value Benefits 209,904 182,337 173,834 158,731 PresentValue Taxes 145,058 159,960 173,405 186,244
Present Value Transfer 64,846 22,377 429 -27,513
Rate of Return 3.16% 2.40% 2.01% 1.51%
Notes: a: Incone taxation of benefits.
b: Payroll taxes paid by those who survive to collect benefits.
c: Benefits net of income taxation.
d: Payroll taxes paid by those whodonot survive to collect benefits.Table A.7
Surplus Dissipated, Funded by Tax Increase After 2025
A. FINANCIAL FLOWS OF OASI TRUST FUND
1986 $BILLI0NS, DISCOUNTED To 1986
SURPLUS TIME PERIOD PAYROLL TAXES BENEFITSBEN TAXE? SURPLUS PAYROLL
1986 TO 2010 39584 4366 3997 114 483 1.22% 2011 TO 2035 38540 4470 4422 158 206 0.54% 2036 TO 2060 34460 4730 4925 196 0 0.00% 1986 TO 2060 112584 13565 13344 468 689 0.61%
B. FINANCIALPATrERNS FOR BIRTH-YEAR COHORTS
1986 $BILLIONS, DISCOUNTEDTO1986
RETIREE.b NET NONSURVIVORREAL RATE Year of Birth TAXES ZENEFITSC TRANSFER TAXESOF RETURN
BEFORE 1912 385 3671 3286 186 11.61% 1913 TO 1922 489 1582 1093 121 5.74%
1923TO 1932 776 1508 732 149 3.72% 1933 TO 1942 952 1446 495 193 2.75% 1943 TO 1952 1378 1695 316 340 1.96% 1953 TO 1962 1527 2040 513 350 2.31% 1963 TO 1972 1450 1809 359 328 2.11% 1973 TO 1982 1378 1660 283 296 2.04% 1983 TO 1992 1500 1751 251 308 1.96%
C. EXPECTED VALUES FOR MIDDLE- INCOME SINGLE -EARNERCOUPLES
(1986 Dollars, discounted to 1986)
Yearof Birth of Couple
1945 1960 1975 1990
* * * * PresentValue Benefits 16l,46O 140,255 133,714 122,097 Present Value Taxes 144,95O 150,028 147,709 146,518 Present Value Transfer 16,510 -9,773 -13,995 -24,421
* Rateof Return 2.34% 1.80% 1.70% 1.44%
Notes: a: Income taxation of benefits.
b: Payroll taxes paid by those who survive to collect benefits.
c: Benefits net of income taxation.
: Payroll taxes paid by those who do not survive to collect benefits.
Same as Base Case.Table AM
Surplus Dissipated -BenefitsReduced After 2025
A. FINANCIAL FLOWS OF OASI TRUST FUND
1986 $BILLIoN5, DISCOUNTED TO 1986
SURPLUS
TIME PERIOD PAYROLL TAXES BENEFITSBEN TAXE? SURPLUS PAYROLL
1986 TO 2010 39584 4366 3997 114 483 1.22% 2011 TO 2035 38540 4232 4175 149 206 0.54% 2036 TO 2060 34460 3784 3940 156 0 0.00% 1986 TO 2060 112584 12381 12112 420 689 0.61%
B. FINANCIAL PATTERNS FOR BIRTh-YEAR COHORTS
1986 $BILLIONS, DISCOUNTED TO 1986
RETIREE.0 NET NONSURVIVORREAL RATE Year of Birth TAXES BENEFITSC TRANSFER TAXESd OF RETURN
BEFORE 1912 385 3671 3286 186 11.61%
1913 TO 1922 489 1582 1093 121 5.74
1923 TO 1932 776 1506 730 149 3.71%
1933 TO 1942 952 1425 473 193 2.71%
1943 TO 1952 1378 1609 231 340 1.80%
1953 TO 1962 1525 1767 242 350 1.89%
1963 TO 1972 1414 1463 49 325 1.56%
1973 TO 1982 1287 1308 21 283 1.54%
1983 TO 1992 1337 1348 11 282 1.54%
C. EXPECTED VALUES FOR MIDDLE- INCOME SINCLE-EARNER COUPLES
(1986 Dollars, discounted to 1986)
Year of Birth of Couple
1945 1960 1975 1990
Present Value Benefits 155,297k l17,851 1O6,195 PresentValue Taxes 144,950 149,825 139,859 128,581
Present Value Transfer 10,347 -31,974 -33,664 -34,844
Rate of Return 2.22% 1.27% 1.17% 1.06%
Notes: a. Income taxation of benefits
b. Payroll taxes paid by those who survive to collect benefits,
c. Benefits net of income taxation.
.Payrolltaxes paid by those who do not survive to collect benefits.
Same as Base Case.